Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
China and the G-21: A New North-South
Divide in the WTO After Cancún?
I. Causes and Triggers of the Cancún Setback
Those not acquainted with the multilateral trading system must be puzzled by recent events and developments in the WTO system which are difficult to reconcile at first glance.
On the one hand, club membership in the WTO seems to promise net gains which are not achievable to outsiders. Otherwise it would be not conceivable why countries like China accepted painstaking and timeconsuming questions-and-answers trials together with far-reaching concessions in all parts of domestic economic policy to join the club.
Candidates like Russia and Saudi Arabia, to name the very few prominent outsiders, behaved similarly. Furthermore, the WTO as a legal device with an institutionalised dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) is unrivaled as witnessed by the high acceptance rate of decisions coming out of the DSM. Since 1995, when the DSM was introduced more than 200 complaints were filed and only very few went through repeated "slopes" including the Appellate Body without consensus on the implementation of rulings and recommendations (WTO 2001: 27) .
On the other hand, there is empirical evidence that the distinction between WTO membership and non-membership is not statistically significant for explaining the intensity of bilateral trade flows (Rose 2002) so that one might argue that non-members face similar conditions of market access as members. And above all, a mounting north-south divide seems to have breaken ground with substantial frustration in developing countries including emerging markets. Frustration has been fuelled by two factors. First, there has been slow implementation of Uruguay Round (UR) commitments in products of export interest to developing countries such as textiles and clothing. Second, developing countries felt under pressure of strong lobbying activities of vested interest groups in developed countries (including NGOs) to negotiate issues outside the core of market access. These issues are either labeled "non-trade concerns" (environment, health, investment, social standards, competition) or are seen as a one-sided gain for developed countries only such as the "extraction of royalty payments" (Bhagwati 2001 ) for protecting intellecual property rights under the TRIPS agreement. Southern countries had good reasons to presume that widening the negotiation agenda was part of a deliberate strategy of northern negotiators to prevent one-to-one trade talks in sensitive items as agriculture, subsidies and labour-intensive goods and to play divideand-rule games.
Developing countries hesitantly agreed to start a new multilateral round before the commitments of the UR were fully implemented and enforced.
Though this round was coined as a "development round" (interestingly enough, by the EU and not the developing countries themselves), from the very beginning, frustration and scepticism dominated the preparatory meetings of the Doha Round (DR) on the side of developing countries.
Lines of arguments among developing countries were by no means homogenous. Some developing countries like the Latin American agricultural producers closed ranks with agricultural exporters from the "north" camp such as Australia and New Zealand in the Cairns Group which was already active in the UR. Other developing countries such as India and Egypt which do not figure prominently as major exporters and pursue more inward-oriented policies, dominated the group of "likeminded" countries. Finally, least developed countries had neither resources nor much interest to take an active pro-trade part in the negotiations because they either feared terms-of-trade losses as net agricultural importers after the phasing out of export subsidies or worried about the erosion of their exclusive trade preferences with OECD countries (in particular the African countries).
In the pre-Cancún meetings, overlapping participation in both the Cairns Group and the "like-minded" countries promoted the emergence of the 1 as the spearhead of resistance against what they criticised as the same procedure as in the UR: an implicit understanding of the EU and the US in compromising on their bilateral conflicts and in proposing a negotiation agenda which reflected common transatlantic trade interests. Two aspects supported the G-21 in their critics before they met in Cancún: First, the common EU/US negotiation proposal on agriculture which -viewed from the G-21 side -basically reflected the EU position of protecting the agricultural sector against excessive adjustment challenges and, second, the reference to the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Meeting where negotiations on competition, investment, trade facilitation and government procurement were agreed upon (so-called Singapore issues). The EU (together with Japan and insisted that these negotiations should be started in Cancún though both conceptually and strategically there were good reasons for denying that these issues belonged to the core WTO tasks rather than mirroring the interests of pressure groups in the EU. proceed. Yet, the trigger of the failure was not identical with its cause.
The Singapore issues were the iceberg of "non-trade concerns" while the G-21 insisted on concentrating negotiations on the basic trade concerns such as abolishment of agricultual export subsidies in the EU and the US, the phasing out of domestic suppport to farmers in the two areas and alleviating market access in both industrial products and agricultural products. Causes of the setback were also rooted in the reciprocity issue. The US and EU demanded full participation of all developing countries in order to discourage freeridership whereas developing countries saw slow implementation of previous commitments in the EU and US as the bottom point to request unilateral liberalisation measures from the Big Two first. Mercantilist games underlying these attitudes can be described as the industrialised countries' view: "without reciprocity no concession" and the developing countries' view: "without concession no reciprocity".
It is a fact that the stalemate situation which emerged from mercantilist games was particularly applauded by the poorest countries without taking into account that they had more reasons to be concerned about the costs of the Cancún setback than other developing countries.
Likewise, it is important to note that China was not among the frontrunners of those G-21 countries like India, Egypt, South Africa and Brazil which accentuated the dissense with the EU and the US and welcomed the setback (Schott 2003 Section III then discusses the alternatives which the major players have should the DR fail in order to assess the credibility of their endeavours to overcome the setback of Cancún.
Section IV addresses the self-interests of China to urge for a successful conclusion of the DR instead of adhering to the alternatives discussed in the preceding section.
One special aspect for China is the parallel debate on exchange rate protection which can, rightly or wrongly, backfire on trade policies especially of the US. This aspect is raised in Section V.
Section VI concludes on the results.
II. The G-21 Group as the Third Major Player: Common Interests For
What or Against What? Brazil as a leading member of the G-21, the critical question is whether G-21 should be instrumentalised against the US and thus also inject tensions into the FTAA process. Hence, given these overlapping memberships, the majority of G-21 members (but not China!) have to assess whether a confrontational stance against the US in the DR will not impair their trade relations with the US either bilaterally or as a member of regional groupings. The probability is high that the US will raise this issue in bilateral trade talks, for instance, with Latin American countries in order to initiate a less confrontational strategy of G-21 or even to diffuse the pressure. In this respect, it is interesting to note, that shortly after the Cancún meeting and after bilateral trade talks with the US administration, some Latin American countries (Colombia, Peru) announced to withdraw from the G-21.
To less extent, these considerations also hold for relations between the EU and specific G-21 countries. South Africa (through membership in the EU-ACP agreement), and some Latin American countries (Mercosur members Brazil and Argentina, as well as Mexico) maintain institutionalised preferential or non-preferential trade relations with the EU. Yet, except for South Africa, the link is much weaker as for the US since the EU is neither a dynamic nor the most important trading partner.
Thus, its retaliatory potential is smaller.
Differences in the degree of vulnerability against economic pressure of the two big WTO players is not the only and perhaps not even the most important dividing element in the G-21. Table 1 It is only Mexico which rivals with China with respect to these performance figures.
Coming to the core area of dispute in Cancún, agriculture, there are striking differences in vested interests between net exporting Cairns Group members on the one hand and net importers on the other hand.
As China belongs to the latter group, empirical estimates on the effects demand such as textile machinery, they could suffer from terms of trade losses due to a DR "with China". It cannot be excluded that some countries in Southeast Asia are responsive to sector-specific lobbying 3 The impact of Chinese WTO accession for Asian regions has been empirically portrayed by Ianchovichina et al. (2002) and Francois and Spinanger (2002) . Further lifting of textiles and clothing tariff and non-tariff barriers in the DR would lead to further pressures on world market prices due to the fact that tariff peaks are still most prominent in this sector. Wang (2003) shows that while Asian newly industrialised economies would benefit from the accession due to the expansion of world trade and ToT improvement, some countries in Southeast Asia would experience more competition in labour-intensive exports and lower prices for their products. Again, these are first-round terms of trade effects which do not take into account second-round dynamic effects.
against the conclusion of a Round which is feared to hurt them in the short run. Dessus et al. (1999) show (again based on CGE modeling) that China would benefit from multilateral tariff liberalisation in terms of welfare gains equivalent to 5.5
per cent of its GDP. The latter estimates include endogenous total factor productivity gains and thus concentrate on dynamic effects which go beyond static terms of trade effects assessed to be always smaller than the dynamic effects. Anderson and Yao (2003: To sum up, G-21 countries are a fragile pressure group with highly diverging interests. Given its unrivaled role as both an export giant (Dutta 2003 ) and highly absorptive import market, China does not represent the median country in the Group which is less dynamic and more inward- 4 China's role in the G-21 during the Cancún meeting has been recognised as moderate and passive (Schott 2003) . This raises the question whether the country sees its interests well represented by the leading proponents of an uncompromising stance against the EU and the US.
The essential imperative is to fix an understanding between G-21 and the EU/US which state of negotiations from Cancún should be taken home to start with new negotiations. This refers to the Singapore issues which in the view of G-21 should be dropped at all but at least three of them (except for trade facilitation). As concerns agriculture, the understanding should be feasible as the Meeting did not break over agriculture but other issues. It is in this sector where a time limit has to be taken into consideration, the so-called "peace clause" from the UR under which WTO member states refrain from dispute actions against other member states, primarily the EU, on subsidy issues. Should member states argue that the EU was the major actor responsible for a non-agreement on agriculture, the Cairns Group and G-21 countries could put the EU in legal jepardy and thus aggravate tensions unless the EU could buy extension via more concessions offered (Thompson 2003) .
The earlier the "bicycle will move again" in the presupposed direction of a single undertaking for the entire round, the less attractive will be the alternatives for the major actors.
Yet, these alternatives do exist, mainly for the EU and the US, to some extent for Latin American G-21 countries but only weakly for Asian G-21 countries including China.
Alternatives for the EU
Traditionally, the EU has been both the inventor and the multiplier of regionalism. The majority of "effective" (in terms of workable) regional trade agreements (free trade areas, customs unions or common markets) notified at the WTO has some involvement of the EU. They are mostly so-called bilateral hub-and-spokes-agreements with the EU as the hub and the partner countries as the spokes which do not share the same preferential trade relations among each other as the EU does. Yet, with the beginning of the nineties, EU regionalism has changed in two ways (Langhammer 2003 China (Langhammer et al. 2002) .
Alternatives for the US
The Bush Administration has increasingly given regionalism higher priority in its trade policy and ranks close to multilateralism. and liberalise trade in services which are specific export interest to US service exporters.
Alternatives for China
Both, the US and EU alternatives point to regional or bilateral agreements as a viable alternative to multilateral negotiations should these negotiations end in a stalemate. Note that the viability is seen from an individual country perspective and not from a world welfare point of view. The US and the EU are large economies with considerable economic, financial and political leverage and can enforce their interests in bilateral negotiations. This is not to say that smaller partners do not benefit from negotiations which are not at level playing field. The "new regionalism" just argues that smaller countries liberalising multilaterally first and then docking on to successful regional schemes with an institutional setting which promises economies of scale can benefit from joining a "club" (Ethier 1998 China will have to meet each of these impediments when negotiating regional or bilateral agreements with developing countries. Most of these countries probably fear China's competitiveness. As the rule of thumb, they will be the more reluctant to "go regional" with China the less they see opportunities to penetrate the Chinese market. These are definitely the low-income countries which fear trade diversion and losses in tariff revenues from free trade with China without being compensated on the export side. In this respect, it is essential to differentiate between regional integration and regional co-operation. The former aims at removing barriers to trade and factor movements within a region (therefore sometimes labeled "negative" integration) while the latter concentrates on joint actions and 5 This is a purely economic view which neglects political tensions in Northeast Asia. From a post-WWII European perspective, one is reminded of the situation in the early fifties when discrepancies between national trade policies of the West European countries were large and political considerations to tie the former political enemy into a set of regional treaties with economic integration as a vehicle for future political integration (Langhammer 2001). projects ("positive" integration). Based on the experience of other regions, Langhammer (2001) argues that China and the entire Northeast Asian region could, substantially benefit from regional co-operation with joint projects in cross-border issues like maritime research, preserving fish stocks, fighting regional environmental pollution problems, common cross-border services like coast guards, and harmonising rules for crossborder flows of capital, labour and individual persons.
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IV. The costs of "Non-Doha": More Vulnerability and Uncertainty for
China
The preceding discussion has shown that unlike the EU and the US, China (and other Asian emerging markets) has fewer alternatives to gain safe access to export markets outside the multilateral system. Regional trading arrangements and bilateral agreements are imperfect substitutes to a multilateral agreement unless they include the EU, the US or Japan as the major markets for more advanced manufactured products.
Overall, a failure of the DR would expose China's economy in general and its manufacturing sector in particular to costly vulnerability and uncertainty. Under this heading, a number of issues can be discussed.
Market access
One of the "evergreen" aspects of market access are tariff barriers. While they have on average been reduced to 4-5 per cent levels in OECD 6 Such joint projects are of course aslo feasible in relations between China on the one hand and US or EU on the other hand. At the October EU-China Summit, common projects were discussed. Yet, given the geographical remoteness between the two regions, the scope of cross-border common projects is more limited than within a group of neigbouring countries in the Northeast Asian region. Any successful conclusion of the DR would also include reforms of the AD agreement because of the single undertaking principle that forbids "raisin picking" and commits all members to approve decisions taken on all sub-issues and their agreements unter the WTO umbrella. Thus, China has the chance to remove protectionist tendencies from the AD agreement only if it concludes on the entire DR.
Safeguard measures and dispute settlement procedures
The discipline of the WTO relative to the GATT has been strongly improved by the introduction of a more binding dispute settlement mechanism which enables the WTO to pinpoint violation of the rules and to identify the member state which is responsible for violating the rules. (Corden 1985 ) that a devaluation is neither necessary nor sufficient to sustain a deliberate policy of exchange rate protection. Nor is a bilateral trade surplus of a country against the another country an indicator for exchange rate protection of the former. The key indicators in favour of assuming that exchange rates are manipulated are monetary and fiscal instruments which are targeted to suppress domestic absorption so that absorption is lower than it otherwise would be. It is also acknowledged that to sustain exchange rate protection over a longer period requires companion policies such as capital controls to prevent capital inflows which are attracted by a high interest rate policy.
Such policy could be part of sterilizing capital inflows (the analogy of a trade surplus) and be necessary to prevent domestic absorption from rising. Such a companion piece does exist in China but seemingly is not used as a sterilising device.
It is not evident that China has pursued an exchange rate protection strategy for a long time. Domestic absorption is high as witnessed by the rapid rise of imports. Furthermore, the Chinese trade surplus with the US is relatively low (relative to cases like Japan and Taiwan China in the eighties).
Yet, as long as the US runs an overall current account deficit, vested interests will argue that this deficit has not its roots in US domestic policies but in mercantilist strategies of countries which implicitly subsidise their exports and thus export unemployment to the US. China is the only G-21 country which is confronted with such attacks and thus again shares other self-interests than the typical inward-looking G-21 median country.
For three reasons, it can be assumed that a conclusion of the DR is instrumental to diffuse protectionist threats from the US (and/or from other OECD countries' side) against China. First, the DR would strengthen intellectual property rights and thus induce further US technology transfer inflows into China and/or draw implicit royalities out of China to the benefit of the US. Second, the DR would both specify Chinese commitments to further open the market and to secure the export base. Chinese economic growth which essentially hinges upon imported technology could thus be stabilised and remain a major absorptive power in world demand. Sole reliance on US demand as a locomotive could be prevented with positive effects on containing the US current account deficit. Third, the DR would help China to make its financial sector more competitive and to facilitate economic restructuring of state-owned enterprises. With the advancement of such process, the exchange rate regime and the convertibility regulations could gradually approach the standard of market economies.
VI. Concluding Remarks
Seen from Europe, Chinas plays an important role in giving a new momentum to the DR and to save the WTO from a post-Cancún stalemate trauma. Yet, to play this role, it is crucial for China that it does not join any "South" coalition in controversy against the "North". It has been shown that the typical G-21 median country is relatively inwardlooking and thus tempted to revitalise such conflicts which we know from the seventies. China would be a strange bedfellow in this group. Its own interests make it a separate player for various reasons. First, its alternatives toward regional integration are very much weaker than those available to the EU, the US or the Latin American economies. Second, it is exposed to the restrictions and uncertainties of the transition period in China's economic size and leverage both on the export and import side, a stronger voice of China pro-DR would have a valuable pump primer effect for a new start.
